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ASPECTS OF ARRANGED MARRIAGES AND THE
THEORY OF MARKOV DECISION PROCESSES
Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

ABSTRACT

The theory of Markov decision processes (MDP) can be used to analyze a wide variety of
stopping time problems in economics. In this paper, the nature of such problems is discussed and
then the underlying theory is applied to the question of arranged marriages. We construct a stylized
model of arranged marriages and, inter alia, it is shown that a decision maker' s optimal policy
depends only on the nature of the current marriage proposal, independent of whether there is recall
( storage) of previous marriage proposals.

JEL classification: J12, D8l , D83
Key words: Markov decision process, arranged marriage, decision making

ASPECTS OF ARRANGED MARRIAGES AND THE
THEORY OF MARKOV DECISION PROCESSES l

1. Introduction

Many problems in the social sciences involve the optimal sequential control of certain kinds
of stochastic processes. In such problems, a stochastic process is observed at various points in time
to be in one of a number of possible states. After each observation, a decision maker takes one of
many possible actions. The sequence of actions taken by the decision maker interacts with the
probabilistic environment to affect the evolution of the underlying stochastic process.

The

mathematical abstraction of this kind of problem is called a Markov decision process (MDP)?
While the theory ofMDPs is widely used to study problems in the operations research literature, this
theory is applied considerably less frequently in economics. This holds true despite the fact that
economic problems as varied as land development over time and under uncertainty, biodiversity
conservation in a dynamic and stochastic framework, and the timing of marriage in an arranged
marriage context, are all amenable to effective analysis with the theory of MDPs.
The arranged marriage problem is of particular interest. Not only have arranged marriages
been around for ,several centuries, they are the rule rather than the exception in many parts of Africa,
Asia and the Middle East. 3 Despite this phenomenon, economists have paid scant attention to
arranged marriages. Indeed, the economics literature on the subject of marriage, pioneered by
1 This research was supported by (i) the Utah Agricultural Experiment Station, Utah State University, Logan,
UT 84322-4810, by way of project UTA 024, and (ii) a Faculty Research Grant. Approved as journal paper No. 5061.
I thank a referee for his input; I alone am responsible for the output.

2Some researchers, such as Derman (1970) and Ross (1974), have used the term "discrete dynamic
programming" to describe similar problems.
3For a more detailed corroboration of this claim, see Mandelbaum (1970), Moore (1994), Otani (1991), and Rao
and Rao (1982).
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Becker (1973, 1991), is largely restricted to an analysis of marriage in a deterministic setting, in the
context of western societies. As such, there exists very little formal knowledge about the nature of
decision making in arranged marriages.
Given this state of affairs, this paper has two objectives. First, we shall demonstrate the
scope ofMDPs by analyzing arranged marriages specifically, and by discussing other problems such
as land development and biodiversity conservation. Second, by focusing on the question "When
should an agent, wishing to have an arranged marriage, say yes to a marriage proposal and not wait
any longer," we shall demonstrate the surprising implications of certain decision-making rules and
thereby increase our understanding of decision making in arranged marriages.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows . Section 2 provides a theoretical description
of MDPs and a stylized model of decision making in arranged marriages. Section 3 discusses our
understanding of arranged marriages in the context of the section 2 findings . Section 4 provides a
discussion of our understanding of decision making which emerges from the findings of section 2.
Finally, section 5 concludes and offers suggestions for future research.

2. MDPs and Arranged Marriages

Becker (1991, p. 324) noted that imperfect information is a key feature of decision making
in the marriage market.

This observation applies with equal force in the context of arranged

marriages as well. The logic of arranged marriages tells us that, because of a variety of reasons such
as (i) imperfect and incomplete information stemming from limited social experiences and travel
opportunities (Goode 1963, p. 210), and (ii) the tendency of young people to seek pleasure (Auboyer
1965, p. 176), young persons generally cannot be trusted to find a suitable mate for themselves. As
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a result, parents, relatives, and, increasingly, matchmaking intermediaries take upon themselves the
task of looking for a suitable bride (or groom). While in western countries, the agent wishing to
marry generally looks for a mate himself (or herself), in an arranged marriage, this important task
is not undertaken by the agent but by his (or her) family, friends, and intermediaries. This is a
fundamental difference between arranged marriages and marriages in western countries.
The second relevant aspect of arranged marriages concerns the marrying agent's decision.
As Rao and Rao (1982, pp. 32-33) noted, in contemporary arranged marriage settings, the agent
wishing to marry has considerable autonomy over the actual marriage decision. That is, while
family and friends look for suitable marriage prospects, it is the agent who decides when to say yes.
This agent receives marriage proposals as a result of the investigative activities undertaken by
others. His (or her) decision is to decide which proposal to say yes to . Clearly, this marriage
decision is indivisible; for the purpose of this paper, we shall assume that it is irreversible as well. 4
Formally, the agent's decision problem is one of optimal stopping. 5
The theory of MDPs can be used to understand the nature of the marrying agent's choice
problem. To this end, let us begin with a general framework of decision making. 6 Consider a
stochastic environment in which our agent, who seeks to be married, receives marriage proposals
/

sequentially in discrete time. The environment is stochastic, because the decision to get married

4By making this assumption, we wish to capture the fact that in most societies, in which arranged marriages
are prevalent, social pressures are such that once the agent agrees to a marriage proposal, it is generally difficult for him
(or her) to renege on the original decision, at least in the short run. We do not wish to imply that separation and/or
divorce is never an option for the agent.

SIt should be noted that, while the marrying agent's role described here is increasingly the prevalent one, it is
not the only possible role. In some arranged marriage settings, the agent's role is largely consultative. For more on this,
see section 5.
6This framework is based on Batabyal (1995).
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depends on the receipt of marriage proposals; these are of uncertain quality. It is assumed that
successive marriage proposals are statistically independent and that the distribution from which
these proposals are drawn is fixed and known to the marrying agent (decision maker). Let X(t) be
the proposal that is received at time t.
mathematically, we have Prob{X(t)

=

j}

If we denote the quality of this proposal by j, then,
=

Pi" As discussed earlier, this receipt of proposals is the

result of investigative activities undertaken by the marrying agent's family, friends, and
intermediaries. The cost of this investigative activity results in disutility to the agent; in what
follows, we assume that the agent altruistically incorporates this disutility in his (or her) overall
decision problem.7
On receiving a marriage proposal, the agent decides whether to say yes to this proposal or
to delay marriage and wait for additional proposals. This decision is based on the agent's utility
from saying yes. Let H(.) be the continuous and strictly monotone function which maps proposals
to utility. In other words, if X(t) is the marriage proposal received at time t, then U(t)

=

H(X(t))

denotes the utility from saying yes, given that a decision to say yes has been made. Note that
because H(.) is a continuous and strictly monotone transformation of X(t) , \;It, it follows that the
successive utilities {U(t) :t

~

O} are also statistically independent and drawn from a distribution that

J

is fixed and known to the marrying agent (see Wolff 1989, for details).
The decision to say no to a specific proposal results in utility as well as disutility to our
agent . The nature of the marriage decision is such that there is an asymmetry associated with the
yes/no decision. A "no" decision always leads to future options, but a "yes" decision terminates the

7The case in which the agent acts selfishly and does not incorporate this disutility is a special case of this more
general formulation. This is discussed at the end of section 3.
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stochastic proposal generation process. 8 As such, the utility from saying no stems from the fact that
the agent preserves the flexibility to receive new proposals, of possibly higher quality, in the future. 9
The disutility arises from the fact that the investigative activities of friends, relatives, and
intermediaries resulting in the receipt of proposals are costly. We shall denote net utility from
saying no, i.e., the net utility of preserving flexibility, by B.
In order to choose an action, our marrying agent must decide on a policy, i.e., a rule for
choosing actions. Policies can be of varying levels of complexity. For instance, a specific policy
may depend on the history of marriage proposals; alternately, it may be randomized in the sense that
it chooses an action with a certain probability. An important subset of the set of all policies is the
set of stationary policies. A policy is said to be stationary if it is nonrandomized and if the action
it chooses at time t depends only on the state of the process (marriage proposals) at time t .
Stationary policies serve as useful "rules of thumb;" as well, the behavioral implications of such
policies can be determined in a relatively straightforward manner. Consequently, in this paper we
shall restrict attention to stationary policies. Rather than provide an exhaustive analysis of every
kind of stationary policy, we shall illustrate the nature of such policies by focusing on the one-step
look ahead policy (OSLAP). When using this policy, a decision maker (for instance, our marrying
)

agent) compares the option of stopping immediately (saying yes now) with the option of waiting for
an additional step and then stopping (saying yes later). If the stopping region determined by the
OSLAP is a closed set, i.e., if this region is an absorbing set for the state variable, then the use of
the 0 SLAP is optimal.

8Also

see footnote 4.

9This is related to the "value of waiting" result in the investment under uncertainty literature. For more on this,
see McDonald and Siegel (1986), Pindyck (1991), and Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
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Let the state at any time t be denoted by the 2 tuple {t, U(t)} where U(t) is the utility that will
be received, should the agent choose to say yes at time t . The reader should note that with this
specification of the state, we have a two-action-say yes or say no-MOP . This is because the
OSLAP is a stationary policy, and because the sequence of states {U(t):t = 0, 1, 2, .. .} forms a
discrete time Markov chain. Now suppose that our marrying agent is able to recall previous
marriage offers. In other words, this agent is able to say yes to a proposal that he (or she) had
previously said no to. In this connection, the two extreme cases are that of perfect recall and no
recall. In the former case, every previously turned down proposal may be recalled at some later
date. In the latter case, it is not possible to recall any proposal that has been declined previously.
In what follows, we shall analyze the implications of recall on the marrying agent's decision as to
when he (or she) should say yes to a specific marriage proposal.
With perfect recall, the state at any time t will be the maximum utility that can be obtained
from saying yes to a proposal at that time. Now the transition probabilities at time t for the
countable state Markov chain {U(t):t ~ O} are given bylO
P ij( t) = 0

if i

> j,

r=i

Pij(t) =

Pi t)

LP

r,

if i

= j,

(1)

1'=0

= ~.,

if

i < j.

The first line of equation (1) tells us that under the OSLAP, the utility Markov chain will not go to
state j if the utility in state j is less than the utility in state i . Hence, P ij(t) = O. The second line of
equation (1) tells us that if the utilities in states i and j are equal, then under the OSLAP the
probability of making a transition from state i to state j is the sum of all the probabilities of receiving

ICNote that the i,} correspond to utility levels in state i and}, respectively.
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utility of amount 0 through i.

Finally~

the last line of equation (1) tells us that if the utility in state

j exceeds the utility in state i, then under the OSLAP the Markov chain will move to state j with

transition probability PI
We shall now characterize the stopping region defined by the OSLAP.

This regIon

corresponds to the set of states for which saying yes in state i is at least as good as saying no and
waiting for exactly one more time period and then saying yes. This stopping region is given by
r =i

S

=

{i : i ~

L

iP r

r=O

+

L

jP j

+

B} .

(2)

j =i+ 1

The first term on the RHS of the weak inequality in equation (2) is obtained from the second line
of equation (1); this term denotes the expected utility in states 0 through i . The second term is
obtained from the third line of equation (1); this term denotes the expected utility in states i + 1
through infinity. Finally, the third term is the net utility from saying no and waiting. After some
algebra, equation (2) can be further simplified to

S

=

{i: 0

~

E[max(U - i, 0)] + B}.

(3)

In equation (3), E[e] denotes the expectation operator, max(e) denotes the maximum operator, and
U denotes utility. The reader will note that because max(U - i, 0) decreases in i, the maximum utility

from saying yes (agreeing to marry) cannot decrease with time. This means that the stopping region
described by S is an absorbing set for the state variable U(t) . Now assuming stability of the utility
Markov chain, 11 the OSLAP involves saying yes at the first instance in which the utility from saying
yes is at least ( where ( solves

i * = min{i : 0

II See

~

E[max(U - i , O)] + B}.

Ross (1970, p. 135) for a necessary and sufficient stability condition.

(4)
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It is important to note that under the OSLAP, the optimal policy never recalls a previously declined
proposal. This means that recall, whether perfect or partial, is irrelevant to the question of deciding
when to say yes to an arranged marriage proposal. We have just demonstrated
Theorem 1:

In the theoretical framework of this paper, the answer to the "When to say yes"
question is invariant to the recall of previous marriage proposals.

Theorem 1 tells us that under the OSLAP, the optimal "saying yes" rule depends only on the
nature of the current marriage proposal, independent of whether there is recall of previous proposals.
Alternately put, the transience of a marriage proposal has no bearing on the answer to the "When
to say yes" question. From a practical standpoint, this means that an agent wishing to get married
in an arranged marriage setting need not make his marriage decision more conservative simply
because proposals, if not acted upon immediately, will be lost. We now discuss, in turn, some of
the implications of this analysis for our understanding of arranged marriages in particular and
sequential decision making in general.

3. Discussion: Our Understanding of Arranged Marriages

Consider the question of the robustness of Theorem 1. In this connection, let us note that
/

the only two assumptions that we needed to obtain the result described in this theorem are (i) that
the successive marriage proposals be statistically independent, and (ii) that the distribution from
which these proposals are generated be fixed and known to the marrying agent (decision maker).
Both these assumptions are fairly standard, and they are not overly restrictive. However, consider
the case in which these assumptions do not hold. If the offers are statistically dependent, then it
would not be possible to characterize the state by the 2 tuple [t, U(t)]. Alternately put, in the Markov
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decision theoretic framework of this paper, we could not represent the state by the marrying agent's
utility. Further, it would not be optimal to stop the utility stochastic process by using a decision rule
such as the OSLAP. If the distribution function from which the proposals are drawn is not known
to the marrying agent, then the problem becomes substantially more complicated. In particular, we
would now have a dynamic problem with an element of inference as well as of decision. In this
situation, one can construct scenarios in which the marrying agent first goes through a period of
learning and then he (or she) makes a decision.
The model analyzed in this paper is a partial equilibrium model. In other words, we have
studied the marriage decision from the perspective of one agent; as such, this analysis is unable to
say much about a market equilibrium. However, it should be noted that this paper is not intended
to be an analysis of an arranged marriage market equilibrium. The basic objective here is to show
that (i) an important real world phenomenon can be effectively modeled using the theoretical
construct of MDPs, and (ii) once this modeling exercise has been carried out, a rather surprising
behavioral result, described in Theorem 1, is obtained.
From an institutional perspective, i.e., arranged marriages in most Asian countries, recall
(storability) is really more of an issue for males who tend to have greater bargaining power. In this
}

connection, the reader should note .that the fact that agents on the other side of the marriage market
are also possibly making decisions sequentially does not make recall a logical impossibility. It
seems reasonable to think of scenarios where agents on both sides of the market are able to say yes
to a previously declined offer. Having said this, it is perhaps most important to note that in the fmal
analysis, recall does not matter and the optimal stopping (when to say yes) rule depends only on the
nature of the current marriage offer, independent of whether there is recall of previous offers.
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It has already been shown that introducing a net benefit term (B) to saying no, and allowing

for the possibility of recall does not make the use of the OSLAP and the associated stopping set,
described by the OSLAP, suboptimal. Introducing additional wrinkles such as discounting or the
noninclusion of the disutility stemming from the investigative costs borne by family and friends in
the marrying agent's decision problem would not change anything either; the essence of Theorem 1
would continue to hold. So we conclude this section by noting that, while other characterizations
of arranged marriages are possible, we do believe that our analysis offers one interesting and robust
characterization.

4. Discussion: Our Understanding of Decision Making

The collection of assumptions that are contained in this paper represents the minimum
number of assumptions that are necessary to tractably model the underlying arranged marriage
problem. In particular, the modeling framework of this paper is interesting and worth knowing more
about because it has wide applicability in economics.12
The reader will note that once the two assumptions that are required for the analysis have
been made, the first task is to recognize that the marrying agent's optimal policy appears to have an
intuitive form: accept the proposal whose utility is at least at some threshold level. The next task
involves recognizing that the use of this kind of an intuitive policy will not be optimal because the
stopping region defined by this policy is not an absorbing set for the state variable. As a result, one
then has to modify the intuitive rule so that the stopping region is a closed set. Once this has been
done, the use of the OSLAP is optimal and hence Theorem 1 follows . Moreover, the assumptions

12This is explained in greater detail in the following section.
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and the use of the OSLAP are necessary and sufficient for the result described in this theorem. This
tells us that the seemingly obvious decision rule that one would want to use is actually suboptimal;
in fact, some work is required to determine the exact nature of the marrying agent's optimal policy.
To shed more light on our understanding of sequential decision making, it helps to consider
the class of stopping problems which have the property described in Theorem 1. This class of
problems has the following attributes:

(i) successive realizations of the state variable are

independent and drawn from a fixed and known distribution, (ii) stopping is an option in all states,
(iii) the problem is stable, (iv) the stopping region is closed, and (v) the horizon is unity. In
problems with these attributes, recall is typically not an issue. However, in problems where recall
is an issue, whether or not there is a declining marginal benefit to recall depends on what can and
cannot be recalled and the costs of such recall. When recall costs are zero and all proposals can be
recalled, there is no declining marginal benefit to recall . However, with convex recall costs and with
limited ability to recall past proposals, a declining marginal benefit phenomenon will typically be
present. 13
Let us conclude this section by noting that in models where recall does matter, the use of a
stationary policy, such as the OSLAP, will generally be suboptimal. Second, the decision-maker's
;

problem will now look more like a search-and-stop problem in which the object that is being sought
can move between the various cells in which the search is being conducted, and the decision maker
has the option of revisiting a previously searched cell. The combination of these two features

13Readers may be wondering about the relationship between our model and a search model. To this end, we
note that while there is no direct relationship between our model and a general search problem, search problems, which
have a stopping option to them, are related to the model of this paper. In particular, if one is prepared to make a number
of assumptions, then one can convert this latter class of "search and stop" problems into an optimal stopping time
problem of the sort analyzed in this paper. For more on this, see Stone (1975).

12
suggests that more general stopping rules, such as the n step look-ahead policy, should be used to
determine when the decision maker should stop in these "recall matters" cases.

5. Conclusions and Extensions

In this paper, we used the theory ofMDPs to formally study the question of marriage in an
arranged marriage setting. In particular, an answer to the "When to say yes" question was provided.
This answer involved a probabilistic comparison of the utility from saying yes at time t, i. e. , U(t) ,
with the expected utility from saying no ( delaying marriage) and waiting for new proposals beyond
time t. Our analysis shows that a marrying agent's optimal stopping rule depends only on the nature
of the current marriage proposal, independent of whether there is recall of previous proposals. One
can extend the analysis of this paper by studying arranged marriage situations in which the marrying
agent's role is not definitive but only consultative. This will involve analyzing a different kind of
stopping problem. In particular, this kind of study will permit richer analyses of the connections
between the investigative activities of family and friends and this modified "When to say yes"
question. Second, one can also analyze the impact of nonstationary policies on the marrying agent's
decision problem. Such an analysis will enable us to have a better understanding of the connections
between alternate forms of decision making and the decision to get married.
As discussed in the previous sections, the theoretical framework of this paper is interesting
and worth knowing more about because it has wide applicability in economics. Indeed, problems
as diverse as land development and biodiversity conservation over time and under uncertainty can
be effectively modeled using this theoretical framework. To see how, consider the land development
problem. A developer has the option of developing his land at anyone of several points in time.

13
The decision to develop will depend on a probabilistic comparison of the profit from developing
now with the profit from waiting now and developing later. This is a stopping time problem, and
it can be analyzed in a Markov decision theoretic framework. Indeed, this kind of analysis will
nicely complement existing work on this question by Arrow and Fisher (1974), Henry (1974),
Capozza and Helsley (1990), and Clarke and Reed (1990) .
As regards the conservation of biodiversity is concerned, consider Swanson's (1995)
perspective on this matter. Swanson (1995) has argued that the global decline in biodiversity is best
viewed as a process of conversion in which naturally existing species have been systematically
replaced by human selected ones. If one views this conversion process as a stochastic process, then
the theory ofMDPs can be used to model a regulator's problem as a stopping time problem in which
the central regulatory task is to halt this conversion process at an appropriately determined point in
time. An analysis of this problem along these lines will usefully extend extant work by Swanson
(1995) and others on the biodiversity conservation question. In these and other ways, the theory of
MDPs can be used to shed light on a number of important and currently outstanding problems in
econorrucs.
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